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K Y B E R N E T I K A - V O L U M E 19 ( 1983) , N U M B E R 4 
A FEW REMARKS ON VECTOR OPTIMIZATION 
FROM THE COALITION-GAME THEORETICAL 
POINT-OF-VIEW 
MILAN MARES 
Some aspects of the multicriterial decision-making problem are similar to the ones solved 
by the coalition-game theory. The similarity is described in this paper, and some properties 
of the vector optimization connected with game theoretical concepts are derived. The main 
results concern the mutual relation between the solution of a game and an acceptable compromise 
multicriterial decision, and some properties of the grouped criteria. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
There exist more general attitudes to the multicriterial decision-making problem. 
One of them is the optimization of complete utilities vectors and the construction 
of some compromise between the demands of criteria and their combinations. The 
usual vector optimization result is represented by a set of utility vectors connected 
with the set of reasonable outcomes of the multicriterial decision-making problem. 
The final result of the decision-making can be chosen from that set by using more 
sophisticated methods. 
The problem of the simultaneous satisfaction of more demands is investigated 
in both, the multicriterial decision-making and the cooperative games, theories. 
This means that there generally exists a similarity between the models used in both 
theories, and a potential possibility to transfer some methods and concepts from 
the coalition-games theory to the multicriterial decision-making. 
The main goal of this paper is to show some possibilities of such applications 
of the game theoretical tools to the vector optimization model, and to derive some 
results concerning those applications. Two conclusive sections are subjected to 
the optimization under an incomplete class of sets of criteria and to some elementary 
results on the elimination of redundant criteria.' 
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1. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
In this section we describe the multicriterial decision-making problem investigated 
in the presented paper. 
We denote by R the set of all real numbers. By / = { 1 , . . . , n} we denote a finite 
set of indices of criteria, and we suppose that n >. 2. Let us consider a non-empty 
set of admissible decisions D. Let <& be an abstract topological space containing the 
consequences of decisions from D. The consequences are connected with decisions 
by means of a result function Q : D -* <$, and we suppose that the set 
C = { c e ^ : there exists de D such that c = d(d)} 
is a compact subset of <€. Let us suppose that the criteria are represented by utility 
functions u, : C ->• R, i = 1, ..., n, which are continuous. 
Remark 1. The compactness of Cand continuity of ut imply that the sets {xe R : 
:3c eC, ut(c) = x} are compact subsets of R for any i e I. 
The utility functions uh iel, form a numerical representation of the criteria pre-
ferences. The higher value of the function w; is achieved, the more the respective 
criterion is satisfied. 
The goal of the multicriterial decision-making is to find optimal utility vectors 
x = (x;);€; achievable by the decisions from D. As the criteria are not independent, 
it is useful to represent not only the possibilities and demands of single criteria but 
also the correlated demands of their groups. 
If K <=. I is a group of criteria then the utility vectors achievable from the point-
of-view of K are the vectors from the set 
(1 A) W(K) = {x = (Xi)iel e R
1 : 3c e C, Vi eK,xt^ ut(c)} = 
= {x e R' : 3de D, VieK, xt S ut(e(d))} . 
Lemma 1. The sets W(K) are non-empty for all K <=. I. 
Proof. The statement follows from the non-emptness of D and from (1.1). D 
Lemma 2. The equality W(K) = R1 holds iff K «- 0. 
Proof. IfX = 0 then by (1.1) xe PF(.K) for any x e R1. If K + 0 then the projection 
o f W ^ i n t o f f * i.e. the set 
0>(W(K), RK) = {xK = (x,)ieK eR
K:3ceC, Vi e K, xt ^ ut(c)} 
is a compact subset of RK as follows from the compactness of C and from the conti-
nuity of all, uf, i el. It means that C is a bounded set, and there exists a yK = 
— (yt)iEKe^K s u c n t n a t J; > ui(c) f ° r some ieK and for all ceC. Then yK $ 
$ &(W(K), RK), y' $ W(K) for / e R1 such that y\ = yt for all ieK. D 
Lemma 3. The sets W(K) are closed for all K a I. 
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Proof. It was shown in the proof of Lemma 2 that tP(W(K), RK) is a compact 
subset of RK for all K <= / , K 4= 0. As W(X) is a cylindric set in ff' over 0>(W(K), 
RK), it is closed, as well. For K = 0 the statement follows from Lemma 2. • 
Lemma 4. If x e JV(.K), yeR1 and x ; ^ >>, for all i e K then y e W(K). 
Proof. The statement follows immediately from (1.1). • 
It is obvious that in real and interesting situations there usually do not exist deci-
sions maximizing all utility functions simultaneously. It is necessary then to find certain 
form of compromise between the demands of criteria and their groups, and to 
describe the boundaries of such comprimises. Investigation of the sets of acceptable 
compromise decisions and their consequences is the main purpose of this paper. 
Let us suppose that for any K cz I there is given a set U(K) c R1 such that 
(1.2) U(K) is closed, 
(1.3) U(K)czW(K), 
(1.4) if x6 U(K), yeR1, x ^ y , for all ieK, then y e U(K), 
(1.5) U(K) #= 0 , 
(1.6) U(I) = W(I) , U(0) = W(9) = R'. 
The sets U(K) help us to repiesent the unacceptability of decisions and their 
consequences. The boundary of U(K) is also the boundary between the acceptable 
und unacceptable utility vectors for the set of criteria Kc I. As the criteria are 
considered to be generally dependent, the sets U(K) are defined not only for single 
criteria but also for all their groups. If in some actual applications some of criteria 
are not dependent, then their independency can be expressed by choosing sufficiently 
small sets U(K) for their groups. 
The difference between the set W(K) and the interior part of U(K) represents the 
space for finding a compromise acceptable for the group of criteria K, the interior 
part of U(K) contains unacceptable utility vectors. 
Before introducing the notion of commonly acceptable utility vectors, it is useful 
to mention the domination relation. If x, yeR1 and K c / , X + d, then we say that 
x domines y via K and write x domK y iff 
(1.7) X,- S; >'; for all ieK, x} > yj for some jeK. 
Some utility vector from R1 can be accepted iff it is achievable by some decision 
from D, and if it cannot be domined by any unacceptable utility vector via any group 
of criteria. Exactly formulated, we say that a utility vector x e R1 is acceptable iff 
(1.8) 3deD, Viel, x) g Ui(g(d)), 
(1.9) V K c / , y-> e U(K) , non (y domK x) . 
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If it will be useful for explanation, we shall use the terms of acceptable decision 
de D or acceptable consequence c e C iff the utilities ut(c), i.e. u,(g(d)), i el, form an 
acceptable utility vector. 
The main goal of this paper is to study the multicriterial decision-making problem 
described by the triplet 
(1.10) (I, W, U), where W = (W(K))KcJ, U = (U(K))KcJ, 
described above. Some methods and results derived in the general coalition-games 
theory will be applied for this purpose. 
2. GENERAL COALITION-GAMES 
The geneial coalition-games concept was introduced in [2] and investigated 
in some other papers including [3] and [4]. Its application to the multicriterial 
decision-making is presented in this paper. For this purpose, it is useful to recall 
here some notions and results concerning the general coalition-games and related 
to the topic of this paper. 
The general coalition-game is a pair (/, V) where 7 is a non-empty and finite set 
of players, and V is a class of subsets of R1, V = (V(K))K<::I. We suppose that 
for any set of players K <= I 
(2.1) V(K) is closed, 
(2.2) if xeV(K), y e R1, x^y, for all ieK, then y eV(K), 
(2.3) V(K) 4= 0 , 
(2.4) V(K) = R1 iff K = 0 . 
The subsets of I are called coalitions, every partition of/ into disjoint coalitions is 
called a coalition structure. The class V is called a general characteristic function 
and vectors from Rl are called imputations. For every K c l w e denote 
(2.5) V*(K) = {ye R': there exists no xeV(K) such that xdomKy} = 
= {ye R1: for all x eV(K) either there exists ieK 
such that xt < yt or xt = yt for all ieK] . 
If Ji C 2' is a non-empty class of coalitions then we denote 
V(Jt) = n V(K), V*(M) = n V*(K) . 
KeJl. KeJC 
For any K <= I we denote by P(K) the set of imputations called the Pareto optimum 
and defined by 
(2.6) P(K) » V(K) n V*(K) . 
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Remark 2. It is obvious from (2.4) and (2.5) that for the empty coalition V(K) = 
= V*(K) = P(K) = R1 holds. 
Theorem 1. If K c /, K 4= 0, then the Pareto optimum P(K) is empty if and only 
if for every imputation x e V(K) there exists ;' e K such that every yeR1 such that 
yt > x ; and y,- = Xj for all;' e K, j 4= i, is also in V(K). In symbols P(K) = 0 iff 
(2.7) Vx e V(K), 3/ e 1C, Vy e ff'((V/ e X, ; 4= i, y} = Xj and yt > xt) => 
=>yeV(K)). 
Proof. If condition (2.7) is fulfilled then for any xeV(K) there exists yeV(K) 
such that ydomKx (cf. (1.7)), and consequently V(K)nV*(K) = 0. If P(K) = 0 
then for every x e V(K) there exists z e V(X) such that z domx x. This means that 
Zj 2: Xj for all j e X and z ; > x ; fot some i e X. As the same relation is true for z, 
(2.2) holds and I is finite, the statement of the theorem and relation (2.7) is fulfilled. • 
Theorem 2. If {('} is a one-player coalition then there exists a real number a e ff 
such that 
P({i}) = {xeR1:Xi = a} 4=0. 
Proof. Assumptions (2.1), (2.2), (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) imply that there exists 
a e ff such that 
V({i}) = {xeR1 :Xi^a} , V*({i}) = {xe R
1 : x ; ^ a} . • 
Theorem 3. If a coalition X contains at least two players then the Pareto optimum 
is empty if there exists L c: K, L 4= 0, and a = (a;);&r e ff
7 such that 
(2.8) V(K)= \J{xeR':Xi^ a,} 
Proof. If (2.8) holds then for every x sV(K) there exists / e Lsuch that Xj ^ â -. 
Let us choose ? e f } J such that z ; = x ;, z ; < x ; for ieJf, i 4= j . Then (2.8) implies 
that z e V(K) and z domK x. Hence, x ^ V*(X), and P(X) = 0. • 
The solution of a general coalition-game is represented by the concept of the 
strong stability. We say that an imputation x e R1 is strongly stable in a general 
coalition-game (/, V) iff 
(2.9) xeV*(X) for all K c / , 
(2.10) x e V(Jf) = fl V(K) for some coalition structure X . 
KeXT 
A coalition structure Jf is strongly stable iff there exists a strongly stable imputation 
x e V(jf). 
In the following sections we shall frequently consider some special types of general 
colition-games. They were investigated in [3] and here we briefly recall their defini-
tions. 
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We say that a general coalition-game (I, V) is super additive iff for any K, La I, 
7C n L = 0, 
V(K u L) = V(K) n V(L), 
we say that it is subadditive iff for any K, L<= I,K n L = 0, 
V*(JC U L ) D V*(/<) n V*(L) , 
and we say that it is additive iff it is superadditive and subadditive. 
Let us consider a one-to-one transformation Tof R1 onto R1. If S <= R1 then we 
denote 
TS = {x e R' : 3y e S, x = Tj} . 
The transformation T is called a game-preserving one iff for any general coalition-
game (7, V) the pair (I, TV) is also a general coalition-game. It was shown in [4] 
that an imputation x e R1 is strongly stable in (/, V) iff Tx is strongly stable in (/, TV). 
3. MULTICRITERIAL DECISION-MAKING PROBLEM 
AND GENERAL COALITION-GAMES 
In this section we show a correspondence between the multicriterial decision-
making problem presented in Section 1 and geneial coalition-games. 
Let us consider a multicriterial decision-making problem (J, W, U) consisting 
of the set of criteria/ and of classes of sets of utility vectors (W(K))Kc:I and (U(K)KcI 
possessing properties introduced in Section 1. 
Theorem 4. If (7, W, U) is a multicriterial decision-making problem then the pair 
(7, W) forms a general coalition-game. 
Proof. The statement follows immediately from Lemma 1, Lemma 2, Lemma 3 
and Lemma 4 and from the definition of a general coalition-game. • 
Theorem 5. If (7, W, U) is a multicriterial decision-making problem then the pair 
(7, U) forms a general coalition-game. 
Proof. The statement follows immediately from the assumptions about the sets 
U(K) introduced in Section 1. • 
Theorem 6. The general coalition-game (7, W) is subadditive. 
Proof. Let us consider K, L<= 7, K n L— 0, and the corresponding sets W(K), 
W(L), W(K u L) given by (IT). If xe W(K u L) then there exists ceC such that 
X; g Mj(c) for all i e T C u L . Hence Xi^u^c) for all ieK and all ieL, and 
W(K u L) <= W(K) n W(L). It was shown in [3], that this inclusion implies the sub-
additivity of the game (7, W). • 
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As the pairs (I, W) and (I, U) are general coalition-games, it is possible to apply 
(2.5) and to define the sets W*(K) and U*(K) for any K <= /.The Pareto optima for 
both games will be denoted by 
(3.1) PW(K) = W(K) n W*(K), PV(K) = U(K) n U*(K) 
for all X c I. 
Lemma 5. If x e Pw(l) then there exis: de D ano ce C such that x ; = u;(c) = 
= ut(g(d)) for al i i eJ . 
Proof. Let us suppose that xefV(j) and there is no c e C such that xt = Uj(c) 
for all is I. Then (IT) implies that there exists c' e C such that x ; ̂  ut(c') for all 
i el and x{ < M,(C') for some i E / . If we denote x' e R' where x\ = ut(c') for all 
i e I then x' e W(l) and x' dom, JC. It means that x £ W*(l) => Pw(l). D 
Lemma 6. The Pareto optimum PW(K) is non-empty for any K cz I. 
Proof. If K = 0 then obviously P^(X) = W(K) = JV*(K) = #?'. If K * 0 then 
the set 
(3.2) {x e R1 : 3c e C, Vi e if, x ; = u;(c)} 
is a compact subset of R1 as C is compact and w; are continuous functions. It means 
that the set (3.2) is bounded. Formula (1.1) implies that for any yeW(K) there 
exists x in (3.2) such that x ; ̂  y( for all ieK. Theorems 1, 2 and 3 imply that 
PW(K) + 0. D 
Lemma 7. The Pareto optimum PV(K) is non-empty for any K <= I. 
Proof. The statement follows from Lemma 6 and from (1.3) and (1.2) in connec-
tion with Theorem 1. D 
4. ACCEPTABLE UTILITY VECTORS AND STRONGLY STABLE 
IMPUTATIONS 
In this section we shall investigate some mutual relations between the solutions 
of the vector optimization problem and the corresponding general coalition-games. 
It means that we shall study some common properties of the ecceptable utility 
vectors defined by (1.8) and (1.9), and the strongly stable imputations defined by 
(2.8) and (2.9). First, we shall introduce an equivalent formulation of the accepta-
bility of the utility vectors and its immediate consequence. 
Remark 3. A utility vector xe R1 is acceptable in the multicriterial decision-
making problem (/, W, U) iff 
(4.1) xeW(l)n(()U*(K)). 
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Remark 4. Relations (4.1) and (1.6) immediately imply that any acceptable utility 
vector belongs to the Pareto optimum 
Pv(l) = PW(I). 
Mutual relations between both types of solutions are described by the following 
statements. 
Theorem 7. If x e R1 is an acceptable utility vector then there exist d e D and 
ceC such that for all ;' e I ut(c) = Ui(g(d)) = x{. 
Proof. The statement follows immediately from Lemma 5 and Remark 4. 
Theorem 8. A real-valued vector x e R1 is an acceptable utility vector in a multi-
criterial decision-making problem (I, W, U) if and only if it is a strongly stable 
imputation in the general coalition-game (I, JJ) and x e U(l). 
Proof. The statement follows from Remark 3 and from (1.6) immediately. • 
Theorem 9. There exists an acceptable utility vector in the multicriterial decision-
making problem (I, W, U) if and only if the coalition structure 7 containing exactly 
the coalition 7 is strongly stable in the general coalition-game (7, U). 
Proof. The statement follows immediately from Theorem 8. • 
The following statements concern the existence of acceptable utility vectors in some 
special cases of the multicriterial decision-making problem and the related general 
coalition-games. 
Theorem 10. If the general coalition-game (7, U) is additive then there exists 
exactly one acceptable utility vector y in the multicriterial decision-making problem 
(7, W, U), and 
(4.2) y = (y . ) w , y, = max {x; : x e U({i})}, iel. 
Proof. As the game (7, U) is subadditive then y e R1 fulfilling (4.2) belongs to 
U*(K) for all K cz I. Moreover, y e U(K) for any coalition K as follows from the 
superadditivity of the game (7, U). It means that y is strongly stable in (7, U), and 
by Theorem 8 y is an acceptable utility vector in (7, W, U). Let us suppose, now, that 
there exists another zeR1, z 4= y, being an acceptable utility vector in (7,W, U). 
It means that z is a strongly stable imputation in the game (7, U), hence z e U*({i}) 
for all ;' eI. It means z ; — yt for all i eI. If z 4= y then there exists j el such that 
Zj > yy Then z dom7 y, and consequently z $ U(l), as follows from the relation 
y e U*(l) shown above. But this fact contradicts to the assumption that z is an 
acceptable utility vector and to Theorem 8. • 
Theorem 11. If the game (7, U) is subadditive then a utility vector x e R' is accept-
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able if and only if 
xePv(l)n(riU*({i})). 
iel 
Proof. The statement follows from Remark 3 and Remark 4 and from the sub-
additivity assumption implying for all K c I 
U*(K) c f| U*({i]) . • 
ieK 
Theorem 12. Let us suppose that the set / contains exactly two criteria. Then there 
exists an acceptable utility vector if and only if the game (I, U) is superadditive. 
Proof. Let/ = {i,j}, and let (I, U) be superadditive. Then 
(4.3) U(l) = W(l)^U({i})nU({j}). 
As 
U({i}) = {x = [>,, Xj) : x, S a,} , U*({i}) = {x = (x , x,) : x, £ a,-} , 
U({j}) = {* = (xb xj) : x, 5£ a,} , U*({j'}) = {x = (xit x,) : x, ^ a,} , 
where at, aj are real numbers, and as (4.3) holds, then there exist de D and y e Pv(l) 
such that 
yt = ui(8(d)) ^ait y, = K,(e(</)) ^ a, . 
Then y e U*({i}) n u*({j}), and j e PV(J). It means that j is an acceptable utility 
vector. On the other hand, let (/, U) be not superadditive. Then there exists z e 
e U({i})n U({j}) such that z$ U(I) = W(J), z = (z;. z,). It means that z,- ^ o,, 
z, ^ a,, and by (2.2) none utility vector x e U*({/}) n U*({j}) can belong to W(J). 
Consequently, there is no acceptable utility vector. D 
There exists an important and often investigated type of coalition-games called 
coalition-games with side-payments. A coalition-game with side-payments can be 
described as a general coalition-game (/, V) such that for every coalition K <= / 
there exists a real number vK such that 
(4.4) V(K) = {xeR':YJxi^vK}. 
ieK 
It is usually supposed that for K, L a J, K n L = 0, the inequality vKuL ^ vK + vL 
holds. The set 
C = {x e Rl : £ x ; = v, and V K c J , ^ ^ DK} 
IE / ieK 
is called a core of the game (/, V). It is not difficult to see (cf. [2]) that C is identical 
with the set of all strongly stable imputations of the general coalition-game (/, V). 
Theorem 8 implies that the existing results on core of the coalition-games with 
side-payments can be used for the investigation of the multicriterial decision-making 
problem in which the sets U(K) can be described by relations analogous to (4.4). 
Moreover, it is possible to apply the results on transformations of general coali-
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tion-games and to transform certain types of the sets U(K) in multicriterial decision-
making problems into some sets of the (4.4) type. It concerns namely the situations 
in which for every i e / there exists an increasing and continuous function ft: R ~* R 
such that for all K c / 
(4.5) U(K) = {xeW':XL (x i )^%} 
ieK 
for some real constants vK. 
5. SUBOPTIMAL SOLUTION 
It is obvious that there exist multicriterial decision-making problems (l, W, U) 
in which no acceptable utility vector can be found. If some rational decision is desir-
able even in those cases then the original decision-making problem must be modified 
in some proper way. Some of these modifications are briefly mentioned in this 
section. 
It is, for example, possible to reduce the sets U(K) of unacceptable utility vectors. 
In such case the set of acceptable utility vectors generally increases. 
Theorem 13. Let (I, W, U0) and (I, W, Ut) be two multicriterial decision-making 
problems such that for any K c I, U0(K) <= Ut(K). If x e R
1 is a utility vector 
acceptable in (I, W, £/.) then it is acceptable in (I, W, U0) as well. 
Proof. It follows from (2.5) and (2.2) that for any K c I 
U*(K) u U0(K) = R
1 = U*(K) u U,(K) . 
It means that for any K c J the inclusion U0(K) cz UX(K) implies U*(K) => U*(K). 
As U0(l) = Ui(I) = W(l) by (1.6), the statement follows from Remark 3. • 
Another possibility is to omit some criteria. It is usually too strong to ignore some 
criterion completely, but it is possible to consider it only in combination with some 
other criteria. In our model, it is possible to consider a subclass Jt of the class 21 
of the groups of criteria. This class Jt needs not contain all one-element groups {i}, 
i e /, nor some larger groups K c I. The preliminary idea given above can be for-
mulated in the following way. 
Let J( c 21 be a class of subsets of I such that 
(5.1) .# + 0 and \J K = I, 
KeM 
and let x e R1 be a utility vector. Then we say that x is Jl-acceptable in the decision-
making problem (I, W, U) iff 
(5.2) SdeD, Vi e / , xt g u(Q(d)), 
(5.3) VKeJt, Vj e U(K), non (y domK x). 
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Remark 5. It can be easily seen that a utility vector x is .^-acceptable iff there 
exists de D such that x( = u,{g(d)) and x e U*(K) for all KeJ/, i.e. iff 
xeW(l)n(f)U*(K)) 
KeJt 
(cf. Theorem 7 and Remark 3). 
Remark 6. If / e Ji <= 2l then every .^-acceptable utility vector belongs to the 
Pareto optima Pv{t) and PV(I). 
The introduction of the .-^-acceptability of utility vectors is motivated by the inten-
tion to substitute the acceptability of utility vectors given in Section 1 by its weaker 
analogy. The modification mostly prefers the demands of larger groups of criteria 
to the demands of the single ones. The existence of the .^-acceptable utility vectors 
and the extent of their set obviously depend on the form of the class Ji. The follow-
ing results concern that dependence. 
Remark 7. Let Ji c 2' and Jf <= 2' fulfil (5 A) and let JI c Jf. If x e R1 is an 
.^-acceptable utility vector then it is also Ji-acceptable, as follows from (5.2) and 
(5.3). 
Remark 8. If Ji = 21 and x e M1 is a utility vector then x is .^-acceptable iff it is 
acceptable. 
Remark 9. If the class Ji contains exactly the set / of all criteria and if x e R1 is 
a utility vector then x is .//-acceptable iff x belongs to the Pareto optima Pv(l) = 
= Pw(l) (cf- Remarks 4 and 6). These Pareto optima are always non-empty as follows 
from Lemma 6. 
Theorem 14. Let us consider groups of criteria K, L <= I,K n L= 0, such that 
(5.4) U*(K u L) => U*(K) n U*(L). 
let Ji <= 21 and Jf <=. 21 where 
(5.5) K,L,KvjLeJi and JT = .# - {K u L} , 
and let * e W1 be a utility vector. Then x is .^-acceptable if and only if it is ^-accept-
able. 
Proof. If (5.4) holds then (5.5) implies 
(5.6) W(I) n ( f) U*(M)) = W(I) n ( fl U*(M)). 
MeJT MeM 
The statement of this theorem follows immediately from (5.6) and Remark 5. D 
Corollary. If K, L <= I, K n L = 0, if (5.4) holds, and if Jf = 2' - {K u L} then 
a utility vector x is ./^-acceptable iff it is acceptable. 
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Theorem 15. If (J, W, U) is a multicriterial decision-making problem, if the general 
coalition-game (J, U) is subadditive, and if we denote by Jl = {{j}}>e/ t r i e c l a s s of all 
one-element subsets of J, then a utility vector x e R1 is .^-acceptable if and only 
if it is acceptable. 
Proof. The statement follows from Theorem 14. If K c J, K 4= 0, and if the game 
(J, U) is subadditive then 
U*(K) ^ C) U*({i}) . 
isK 
Consequently, for 
Jl = {{/}},.__; and JT = .# u {K} , 
a utility vector x e W is .^-acceptable iff it is ./(^-acceptable. Repeating the procedure 
for all K c J, it can be shown that any x e R1 is .^-acceptable iff it is 2/-acceptable, 
and Remark 8 completes the proof. • 
It is obvious that in case of subadditivity of the game (I, U) no real reduction 
of demands of criteria was done, and the game (I, U) does not differ from (I, W). 
6. REDUNDANT CRITERIA 
In the previous section, we have investigated the situation in which some groups 
of criteria are omitted in order to increase the possibility of finding some acceptable 
utility vectors at least in the weaker sense. 
Here we shall consider a rather opposite problem. There often exist some groups 
of criteria which do not influence the acceptability of utility vectors, or which in-
fluence it in a minimal degree. Then it is useful to eliminate those groups of criteria 
in order to simplify the considered multicriterial decision-making problem and the 
necessary manipulation with its elements. 
In this section, we introduce a few results concerning the groups of criteria not 
influencing the acceptability of utility vectors at all. It can be easily seen that the 
reduction of the redundant sets of criteria is a reduction of a class Jl c 21 (including 
Jl = 21) to some subclass JT c Jl. In fact, the first result of this type is presented 
in Theorem 14. Other theorems concerning the situation in which the class Jl c 2' 
can be reduced follow. 
Lemma 8. Let us consider K c I, K + 0, Jl c 21, JT c 21, K e JT, Jl = JT -
- {K}. If x e R1 is a utility vector such that x e W(K) - U(K) then x is .#-accept-
able iff it is ./V-acceptable. 
Proof. By Remark 7, any ./F-acceptable x e R1 is also .^-acceptable. If x is 
.^-acceptable and if xeW(K) - U(K) then x e U*(K), and x is .^-acceptable. • 
Theorem 16. Let us consider a multicriterial decision-making problem (I, W, U). 
Let Ke2\K + (D,J/ cz2',jr <=2I,KeJr,Jt =JT - {K}. If for any .^"-accept-
able utility vector y there holds y e W(K) - U(K) then the sets of ^-acceptable 
and ./F-acceptable utility vectors are identical. 
Proof. The statement follows immediately from Lemma 8. • 
Theorem 17. Let us consider a multicriterial decision-making problem (7, W, U). 
LztK,LczI,KczL,Mcz2r,Jfcz2I,K,LeJf,J4=Jf- {K}. If U(K) c U(L) 
then the sets of ^-acceptable and ./F-acceptable utility vectors are identical. 
Proof. If xeRr is ./f-acceptable then it is also ^-acceptable as follows from 
Remark 7. Let us consider an ^-acceptable utility vector x e Rr. It means that 
xe U*(L). If U(L) z> U(K) then also U*(L) cz U*(K) as follows from (2.5). This 
means that x e U*(K). • 
The last theorem of this section concerns a rather degenerated case of the multi-
criterial decision-making problem. 
Theorem 18. Let us consider a multicriterial decision-making problem (I, W, U), 
and let the Pareto optimum Pw(l) be a one-element set. Then there exist de D and 
ceC, c = g(d), such that the utility vector (t/,(c))ie/ is the exactly one acceptable 
utility vector in (I, W, U), and the vectors (ut(c))ieK are single acceptable utility vectors 
in multicriterial decision-making problems (K, W0, U0), where K c I, K 4= 0, and 
for any L cz K is W0(L) = W(L), U0(L) = U(L). 
Proof. If 
(6.1) Pw(l) = {x}, x = (xi)ieJeR
r 
then by Lemma 5 there exist de D and ceC such that 
c = g(d), x ; = w;(c) for all iel. 
Moreover, (6.1) and the relation Pw(l) = W(l) n W*(l) imply that if y eW(l)'then 
(6.2) yt S x{ for all iel. 
The same is true for all utility vectors yK = (yt)ieK with regard to xK = (x;)ii7. As for 
a n y yK + xK, K cz I, K + 0, then at least one of the inequalities in (6.2) is strict. 
It means that 
PW(K) = {zeR
r :Zi = Xi for all i eK] , 
and for the reduced multicriterial decision-making problems (K, W0, U0) described 
in the statement of this theorem 
PWQ(K) = {xK} . 
It means that x e W*(K) for all K cz I, and x e U*(K) for all X c l . a s U(K) c W(K). 
Consequently, x is acceptable in (/, W, U) and in (K, W0, U0) of the described 
type, and there does not exist any yK e R
1 acceptable in (K, W0, Uc) f0r any K cz I 
K * 0. n ' 
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7. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
The theoretical concepts presented in the previous sections aie illustrated here 
by simple examples of the multicriteiial decision-making problems. 
Example 1. Let us suppose that the set D of decisions is the set of all probability 
distributions over four pure decisions <5(1), b(2\ <5(3), <5(4), i.e. 
4 
D = {d = (dud2,d3,dA):0 ^ dt, i = 1, . . . ,4 , £ dt = 1} . 
i = l 
For every decision d e D, the probability of acception of the pure decision 6(i) is 
ci., i = 1, . . . , 4. The set of consequences is naturally the set of all probability distribu-
tions over four pure consequences c(1), c(2), c(3), c(4), where c ( 0 = g(d(i)). It means 
that 
4 
C= {c = (cu c2, c3, cA) : 0 =g c„ i = 1, . . . , 4, £ c, = 1} , 
i = l 
and for every ceC such that c = q(d) is c( = dt, i = 1, . . . , 4. The consequences 
and the corresponding decisions are ordered by means of three criteria, I = {I, 2, 3}, 
represented by the utility functions uu u2, u3. Let 
M l ( c
( 1 ) ) = 6 , M2(C
(1)) = 2 , M3(C
(1)) = 4 , 
Ul(c
(2)) = 2 , M2(C
(2)) = 6 , M3(C
(2)) = 4 , 
Ml(c
(3)) = 2 , M2(C
(3)) = 2 , M3(C
(3)) = 8 , 
M](c
(4)) = 3 , M2(C
(4)) = 3 , u3(c
(4>) = 5 , 
and, of course, 
^ - І Í W ^ - І - W Í Í - 0 1 ) ) , 
J = l j = l 
for i- e I. 
Then ffr = W3 is the space of the utility vectors x = (xu x2, x3), and obviously 
W(I) = {x e « 3 : JC. + x2 + x3 = 12, x. + x2 = 8 , 
x2 + x3 ^ 10, Xj + x3 ^ 10, Xj = 6, 
*2 =i * 3 ^ 8} , 
W({\, 2}) = {x G « 3 : x t + x4 g 8, xj = 6, x2 = 6} , 
JV({1, 3}) = {x e R3 : x2 + x3 g 10, x2 = 6, x3 = 8} , 
W({1, 3}) = { « » 3 : i , + x3 g 10, x, ^ 6, x3 = 8} , 
HK({1}) = {xeR3:xx = 6}, JV({2}) = {x e ff
3 : x2 ^ 6} , 
>V({3}) = { x e W 3 : x 3 = 8 } . 
The set of the achievable utility vectors W(l) is presented in Figure 1. It can be easily 
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seen that the utility vectors 
x (1) = (6, 2, 4) , x(2> == (2, 6, 4 ) , *
( 3 ) = (2, 2, 8) , x (4) = (3, 3, 5) 
representing the utilities of c(1), c<
2>, c(3), c(4), respectively, fully determine the men-
tioned sets. The utility vector xw is domined, e.g. by the utility vector x = (3-4, 
,u . 
Fig. 1. The set W(I) of the multicriterial decision-making problem in Examples 1, 2 and 3. 
3-4, 5-2) e W(I) and it cannot belong to W*(K) for any K cz I, K +- 0. It is not 
difficult to see that 
W*(I) = (R3 - W(I)) u {x e R3 : x. + x2 + x3 = 12} = 
= {x e B3 : (xi + x2 + x3 ;> 12) or (xj + x2 > 8) or 
(x2 + x3 > 10) or (xx + x3 > 10) or (xt > 6) or 
(x2 > 6) or (x3 > 8)} , 
and analogously 
W*({\, 2}) = (B3 - W({\, 2})) u {x e B3 : xi + x2 = 8} = 
= { x e f i 3 : (*i + x2 ^ 8) or (xj > 6) or (x2 > 6)} , 
W*({2, 3}) = (B3 - JV({2, 3})) u {x e R
3 : x2 + x3 = 10} = 
= {x e R3 : (x2 + x3 ^ 10) or (x2 > 6) or (x3 > 8)} , 
W*({1,3}) = (R3 -W({l,3}))yj{xeR3 :Xl + x3 = 10} = 
= {x e R3 : (xi + x3 > 10) or (x, > 6) or (x3 > 8)} , 
W*({1}) = { x e B 3 : x x > 6 } , JV*({2}) = {x e B
3 : x2 ^ 6} , 
W*({3}) = {x e B3 : * 3 k 8} . 
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It means that 
Pw(l) = W(l) n W*(l) = 
= {x e R3 : xt = 2 + 4X, x2 = 2 + 4fx, x3 = 8 - 4X - 4M, 
0 g A, 0 g n, X + A* S 1} , 
and 
P r ( { l , 2}) = {xe W
3 : x, = 2 + 4A, x2 = 6 - 42, 0 = A = 1} , 
Pw({2, 3}) = {x e «
3 : x2 = 6 - 4A, x3 = 2 + 61, 0 = X = 1} , 
iV({l, 3}) = {x e « 3 : x, = 6 - 42, x3 = 4 + 4X, 0 = A ̂  1} , 
/V({1}) = { « H 3 : x 1 = 6 } , ^ ( { 2 } ) = { x e «
3 : x 2 = 6 } , 
Pw({3}) = { x e «
3 : x 3 = 8 } . 
The game (/, W) is described, now, and it is desirable to introduce the sets U(K), 
K c / , and the game (J, U) as well as the multicriterial decision-making problem 
(I, W, U). 
Let us suppose that a consequence c e C is unacceptable iff 
ut(c) < 2 or M2(C) < 2 or u3(c) < 6 
or if for its common utility for pairs of criteria the following inequalities hold 
«i(c) + u2(c) < 4 or u2(c) + u3(c) < 9 or ut(c) + u3(c) < 6 . 
It means that the sets U(K) for K <= / are described by the formulas 
U(l) =W(1), 
U({1, 2}) = {x e R3 : x. + x2 < 4, xt < 6, x2 < 6} , 
U({2, 3}) = {x e R3 : x2 + x3 < 9, x2 = 6, x3 < 8} , 
U({1, 3}) = {x e R3 : X! + x3 < 6, x t = 6, x3 = 8} , 
U({1}) = { x e « 3 : x ! ^ 2 } , W({2}) = {x e R2 : x2 < 2} , 
U({3}) = {xeK 3 : x 3 < 6 } , 
and 
í/*(/) = W*(I), 
U*({1, 2}) = {x e Я 3 : (xj + x 2 > 4) or (x^ > 6) or (x2 > 6)} , 
U*({2, 3}) = {x є Я 3 : (x2 + x 3 ^ 9) or (x2 > 6) or (x3 > 8)} , 
U*({1, 3}) = {xє Я 3 : (Xl + x 3 ^ 6) or (Xl > 6) or (x3 > 8)} , 
U*({1}) = { x є Я 2 :x x = 2 } , W*({2}) = {x є Я
2 : x 2 ^ 2} , 
U*({3}) = { x є Я 3 : x 3 = 6 } . 
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Then the set of all acceptable utility vectors is the following one (cf. (4.1)) 
W(I) n U*(I) n U*({1, 2}) n U*({1, 3}) n U*({2, 3}) n U*({1}) n 
nU*({2})nU*({3}) . 
The set is equal to 
W(I) n U*(I) n U*({2, 3}) n U*({3}) = 
= {x e « 3 : Xj + x2 + x3 = 12, x2 + x8 ^ 9, xl ^ 2, x2 ^ 2, x3 ^ 6} . 
This set is fully determined by the following utility vectors 
x(3) = (2, 2, 8), y i , = (2 ,4 ,6 ) , / 2 > = (3 ,2 ,7) , j(3> = (3, 3, 6) 
as their convex hull, and it is presented in Figure 2. It means that the set of all accept-
able utility vectors can be also expressed in the following form 
{x e R3 : x t = 3 - A - n, x2 = 3 + A — fi - v, 
x3 = 6 + 2/i + v, 0 g A, 0 g /., 0 .g v, X + /. + v = 1} . 
û  
Fig. 2. The sets of acceptable utility vectors in Examples 1, 2 and 3. 
It is obvious that in this example the groups of criteria {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {l}, {2}, are 
redundant in the sense described in Section 6. 
Example 2. Let us consider the decision-making problem described by Example 1 
with rather modified sets U(K) for some K <= I. Such situation is described by Theo-
rem 13. Let us preserve the sets U(K) from Example 1 for K <= I,K + {2, 3}, and let 
U({2, 3}) = {x e K3 : x2 + x3 ^ 8, x2 ^ 6, x3 = 8} . 
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Then the set of acceptable utility vectors is equal to 
W(I) n U*(I) n U*({3}) = 
= {x e R2 : xj + x2 + x3 = 12, xt ^ 2, x2 ^ 2, x3 ^ 6} . 
It is the convex hull of the utility vectors 
x (3) = (2, 2, 8) , j ( 1 ) = (2, 4, 6) , j ( 4 ) = (4, 2, 6) , 
(see Figure 2). 
Example 3. The decision-making problem described by Example 1 can be also 
considered for the construction of a suboptimal solution in the sense of Section 5. 
Let us consider the multicriterial decision-making problem (I, W, U) introduced 
in Example 1, and the class of sets of criteria Jt = {/, {2, 3}}, where 
U(I) = W(l), 
U({2, 3}) = {x e R3 : x2 + x3 g 9, x2 g 6, x3 ^ 8} . 
Then the set of all ^//-acceptable utility vectors is the following one 
W(I) n U*(7) n U*({2, 3}) = 
= {x e R3 : Xl + x2 + x3 = 12, x2 + x3 ^ 9, x t ^ 2, x2 ^ 2, x3 ^ 6} . 
It is the convex hull of the utility vectors 
x (2) = (2, 6, 4) , x (3) = (2, 2, 8) , j ( 2 ) = (3, 2, 7), j ( 5 ) = (3, 5, 2) 
(see Figure 2). 
Example 4. Another decision-making problem appears if we do not admit the 
probabilistic mixture of the given pure decisions, it means if we consider only pure 
decisions <5(1), <5(2), <5(3), <5(4) and their pure consequences. Let us consider the decision-
making problem with I = {1, 2, 3} and 
D = {<5(1), <5(2), <5(3', <5(4)} , C = {c(1), c(2), c(3), c(4)} , 
eW = e(&(0) t i = i, 2, 3, 4 . 
Let the criteria be represented by the utility functions w,-, i = 1, 2, 3, with the values 
« ;(c
u)), i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, given in Example 1. 
Then the sets W(K), K <=• I, are determined by the utility vectors x(1), x(2), x(3), x (4) 
known from Example 1. Namely 
W(I) = {x e R3 : (xt ^ 6, x2 ^ 2, x3 ^ 4) or (x. = 2 , 
x2 ^ 6, x3 g 4) or (xj ^ 2, x2 ^ 2, x3 g 8) 
or (Xl ^ 3, x2 ^ 3, x3 ^ 5)} , 
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W({\, 2}) = { i e ß 3 : (x, g 6, x2 й 2) or (x^ й 2, x2 й 6) 
or (XІ g 3, x2 й 3)} , 
W({2, 3}) = {x є Я 3 : (x2 Ś 6 , x 3 g 4) or (x2 й 2, x3 ѓ 8) 
or (x2 Ş 3 , x 3 á 5)} , 
W({l,3}) = {xєR3:(Xlй6, x3ѓ4) or ( x 1 | 2 , x 3 g 8 ) 
or (XІ g 3, x3 й 8)} , 
řF({l}) ^ { x є ť i x ^ б } , W({2}) = {xєR3 :x2йв}, 
W({3}) = { x e й 3 : x 3 ^ 8 } . 
ІU, 
Fig. 3. The set W(I) of the multicriterial decision-making problem in Example 4. 
Those sets can be seen in Figure 3. Then 
W*(l) = (R
3 - W(I)) u {*(1>, x<-
2\ xi3\ x(4>)} , 
W*({1,2}) = (R3 - P V ( { l , 2 } ) ) u { x e « 3 : ( x 1 = 6, x 2 = 2) 
or (Xl = 2, x 2 = 6) or (x, = 3, x2 = 3)} , 
W*({2, 3}) = (W3 - W({2, 3})) u {x e »
3 : (x2 = 6, x 3 = 4) 
or (x2 = 2, x 3 = 8) or (x2 = 3, x 3 = 5)} , 
W*({\, 3}) = ( « 3 - W({h 3})) u { x e f i 3 : (x, = 6, x 3 = 4) 
or (Xl = 2, x 3 = 8) or (x, = 3, x 3 = 5)} , 
*V*({1}) = {xe j} 3 :Xi = 6} , FV*({2}) = {.* e » 3 : x 2 ^ 6} , 
^*({3}) = { x e « 3 : x 3 ^ 8 } , 
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and the Pareto optima are 
PW(I) = {*<*>, x<
2>, x<3>, x<4>} , 
Pw({\, 2}) = {x e R
3 : (x, = 6, x2 = 2) or (x, = 2, x2 = 6) 
o'* (*i = 3, x2 = 3)} , 
Pw({2, 3}) = {x e »
3 : (x2 = 6, x3 = 4) or (x2 = 2, x3 = 8) 
or (x2 = 3, x3 = 5)} , 
Pw({\, 3}) = { x e f l
3 : (xi = 6, x3 = 4) or (x t = 2, x3 = 8) 
or (xj = 3, x3 = 5)} , 
/V({1}) = { x 6 « 3 : x , = 6 } , P,({2}) = { « f i 3 : x 2 = 6 } , 
IV({3}) = { x e f f 3 : x 3 = 8 } . 
Let us suppose that the unacceptability of consequences is analogous to Example 1. 
It means that a consequence c e C is not acceptable if 
Mj(c) < 2 or M2(C) < 2 or M3(C) < 6 
Mj(c) + M2(C) < 4 or M2(C) + M3(C) < 9 or uy(c) + M3(C) < 6 . 
U(I) =W(I), 
U({\, 2}) = {x e » 3 : Xi + x2 = 4} n JV({1, 2}) = 
= {x e ff3 : xj + x2 = 4, Xi ̂  6, x2 = 6} , 
U({2, 3}) = {x e ff3 : x2 + x3 = 9} n JV({2, 3}) = 
= {x e R3 : (x2 + x3 = 9, x2 = 2, x3 = 8) or 
(x2 + x3 = 9, x2 ̂  6, x3 = 4) or (x2 = 3, x3 = 5)} , 
£/({l, 3}) = {x e ff3 : xt + x3 = 6} n W({1, 3}) = 
= {x e ff3 : x2 + x3 = 6, xj = 6, x3 = 8} , 
{x e H3 : Xi = 2} , v({2}) = {x e R
3 : x2 = 2} , 




(see also Figure 4), and 
U*(I) = W*(I), 
U*({1, 2}) = (ß 3 - v({l, 2})) u {x e W3 : Xi + x2 = 4} = 
= {x e R3 : (xx + x2 = 4) or (xx > 6) or (x2 > 6)} , 
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U*({2, 3}) = (R3 - U({2, 3})) u {x e R
3 : x2 + x3 = ?}
 u 
u{xeR3 :x2 = 3, x3 = 5} = 
= {x e R3 : (x2 + x3 > 9) or (x2 > 2, x2 > 5) or 
(x2 > 3, x3 > 4) or (x2 = 3, x3 = 5) <w (x2 > 6) 
or (x3 > 8)} , 
U*({1,3}) = (« 3- U({í,3}))Kj{xefí3:Xl + x3 = 6} = 
= {xeR3 : (xt + x3 ^ 6) or (x. > 6) or (x3 > 8)} , 
U*({1}) = { x e í ? 3 : x 1 Ž 2 } , U*({2}) = { x e W
3 : x 2 > 2 } , 
U*({3}) ={xeR3:x3 = 6} . 
win 
Fig. 4. Intersection of the sets W({2, 3}) (hatched) and U(_{2, 3})_with the plane {x 6 W3 : Xj = 0}. 
Then the set of all acceptable utility vectors is the following one: 
W(I) n U*(I) n U*({1, 2}) n U*({2, 3}) n U*({1, 3}) n U*({1}) n 
n U*({2}) n U*({3}) = W(l) n U*(7) n U*({2, 3]) n U*({3}) = 
= {* (1), * (2 ), * (3 ), x(4)} n U*({2, 3}) n U*({3}) = {*(3)} . 
It means that there is exactly one acceptable utility vector *<3> corresponding to the 
decision (5(3) and its consequence c(3). 
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8. CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
It was shown above that some features of the multicriterial decision-making can 
be modelled by the general coalition-games. The game theoretical tools enable us 
to reduce the set of possible decisions and their consequences, and to eliminate 
the evidently unacceptable ones. The final set of acceptable utility vectors (connected 
with acceptable decisions and their consequences) is formed by the utility vectors 
which are really achievable and are not domined by any unacceptable utility vector. 
These utility vectors and the corresponding decisions can be treated by other, more 
sophisticated, methods in order to find the optimal decision. The application of that 
detailed methods is not influenced by the properties of unacceptable decisions. 
The game theoretical methods can also lead to elimination of some criteria which 
do not appear to be essential for the considered problem. A few results of that type 
are presented above. However, the effective methods of elimination of less important 
criteria represent an open problem which can be solved by the model given in this 
paper. 
(Received October 22, 1982.) 
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